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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CO-AX ENTERPRISES,
a corporation,

]
]

Plaintiff
and Appellant, ;
i

Case No. 20033

vs.
THE TRIAX COMPANY,
Defendant
and Appellee.
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE THE TRIAX COMPANY REPLY
TO PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING

The Respondent, The Triax Company, submits the following in reply to the Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.
I.
THE APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING FAILS TO COMPLY
WITH RULE 35 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court sets out
the narrow basis upon which a Petition for Rehearing may be made.
A Petition must "state with particularity the points of law or
fact the which the Petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or

misapprehended,ft

The Petition for Rehearing filed in the instant

case fails to set forth any law or facts which the Court has
overlooked or misapprehended.

The Petition for Rehearing is

simply a rebriefing of the same issues, same legal arguments, and
same matters set forth in the prior briefs before the Court, The
Petition does not set out any
overlooked or misapprehended.

fact or law which the Court
No argument is asserted in the

Petition that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended either
the facts or the law.
The Petition for Rehearing quotes from the verdict of
the lower court on pages 3 and 4.

The same portion of the

verdict was quoted by the Supreme Court in its decision, on pages
3 and 4 of the slip opinion.

The same quote also appeared in the

prior original brief filed in this appeal by the Respondent on
pages 6 and 7.

Clearly, therefore, the Court did not overlook or

misapprehend this matter.

The Court was well informed, con-

sidered the matter, and reached a reasoned decision.

Appellant

is merely asking the Court to please change its mind.

This, of

course, does not comply with Rule 35.
In the Petition

for Rehearing the Appellant places

great emphases upon two cases.

These cases are Guerini Stone Co.
2

v, P. J. Carl in Constr. Co., 248 HcS. 334 (1919) and Walsh v.
United States, 102 F.Supp. 589 (Ct. CI. 1952) both of these cases
were cited and argued in the Appellant's prior brief.

Guerini

was cited on page 10 of Appellant's prior brief and Walsh was
cited on page 11.

Furthermore, the slip opinion of the Supreme

Court cites both of these cases on page 5 of the decision.
Again, there is no doubt that the Court did not overlook or
misapprehend the cases.

Appellant does not urge that they were

overlooked or misapprehended.

Appellant merely is reasserting

the same matter already briefed, argued and considered by the
Court.

Rule 35 contemplates more than this.
The Appellant also cites Bvrne v. Bellincrham Consol.

School Dist. No. 301, 108 P.2d 791 (Wash. 1941) on page 3 of its
Petition for Rehearing, which is the same case that was cited on
page 13 of the Appellant's original brief and argued there.
Llovd v. Murphy 153 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1944) appears on page 4 of the
Petition for Rehearing and appeared previously on page 13 of the
Appellant's prior brief.

Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d, 957 (5 CA 1976) appears on page 4 of the
Petition for Rehearing and appeared previously on page 14 of the
Appellant's prior brief.

In short, every significant case cited,
3

and every quote from the lower court appeared in the prior briefs
and arguments submitted to and considered by the Court.
Rule 35 requires that the Petition point out matters
that have been overlooked or misapprehended, and the Petition has
failed to do so or to even suggest that the Court has failed to
apprehend or consider what is now being argued again.

Appellant

is merely asking the Court to look at the same arguments, same
facts, same cases and change its mind, and is a rather cynical
expression of doubt in the finality of the Court's decision
making.

Appellant apparently believes that if you ask the same

thing twice the Court may say "no" the first time and "yes" the
second.

Rule 35, of course, requires more than this.

Accord-

ingly, the Petition for Rehearing should be summarily denied for
failure to comply with Rule 35 of the Rules of Utah Supreme
Court.
II.
THE JURY VERDICT WAS INTENDED BY THE LOWER COURT AND
BOTH PARTIES TO DISPOSE OF THE ENTIRE CASE, AND THE VERDICT DID
SO.
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In the Petition for Rehearing the Appellant complains
that the lower court reached a conclusion on a matter that was
"something the jury had not been asked to decide."

(page 3 of

Petition for Rehearing)

It was the

This assertion is incorrect.

intention of the lower court, and the intention of both parties,
to submit the entire matter for decision by the jury.

The Jury

Verdict Special Interrogatories prepared by the lower court and
submitted to the jury had the approval of both the Appellant and
the Respondent.

The purpose of the Jury Trial was to allow the

jury to decide the case in its entirety.
either party

it was not expected by

that there would be anything

left for further

resolution by the Court or by the parties after the jury had
ruled.
Interrogatory number 5 was approved by the Appellant.
Interrogatory number 5fs purpose was to eleminate any liability
on the part of the Respondent if the jury found that there had
been no promise made.
not limited

to an

Significantly, Interrogatory number 5 is

"express" promise, although the Appellant

argues that it should be construed as such after the fact.

The

Interrogatory asks whether or not there was a promise or guaran-

5

tee, presumably either expressed or implied.

In any event, the

purpose of the Interrogatory was to dispose of the case.
The trial court heard the evidence presented by both
sides.

The trial court was in a position to allow or disallow

parole evidence in the court below.

The lower court elected to

permit parole evidence to be introduced.
upon

parole

evidence

that

the written

The admission was based
contract between the

parties was modified to include a time period for performance.
Finding a time period for performance, however, does not conclusively establish that there was an undertaking or assumption
of risk by the Respondent guaranteeing that the time period would
be met.

As the parole evidence was received the lower court

heard testimony about the parties1 prior experience with construction

in

"remote places".

Both the Appellant and the

Respondent were familiar with work in the remote* area of Midway
Island.

Both parties knew that there were not materials avail-

able at the site except those that were brought in by boat.

Both

knew that all workman had to be transported to the job site as
well.

Both knew that making guarantees or promises that ship-

ments would

arrive

timely

remoteness of the location.

could

not

be possible

given the

The lower court heard, understood,
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and ruled in light of the evidence that it received at the time
of the trial.

(See Transcript at page 45 line 17 et seg. ; and

pages 66 through 70)
At the conclusion of the presentation at trial the
lower court framed ten special Interrogatories for the jury.
The Interrogatories were designed to allow the jury to find what
the parties intended for the time of performance and who would be
responsible if the limitations were not met.

In doing this the

lower court framed Interrogatory number 4 which asks whether the
Appellant was hindered by the conduct of the Respondent in the
delivery of the materials.

The Interrogatory was intended to

establish that the non-delivery of materials by the Respondent
had caused the Appellant to be unable to complete the work within the time limitation.

The jury answered this Interrogatory

"yes".
The Court then posed Interrogatory number 5 which asked
whether the Respondent promised or guaranteed that sufficient
materials would be at the job site in order to permit the
Appellant to perform the contract within the agreed five month
limitation.

To this the jury responded "no".

At this point the

lower court, the jury, the Appellant, and the Respondent realized
7

that the evidence received, both oral and documentary, had made
it clear that the contract in question was to be performed in a
"remote place" and that this fact had been recognized by both
parties when contracting.

This fact prevented Respondent from

promising or guaranteeing that materials would be delivered in a
specific time frame.

Both parties were experienced

in con-

struction work and both parties knew that such a guarantee or
promise could not be reasonably made.

This was the clear import

of the lower court's decision, and the clear result of the jury's
deliberation and decision.
In the Petition for Rehearing the Appellant cites LLoyd
v. Murphy,

Supra, and Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., Supra, for the proposition that a "promisor"
assumes

a

certain

risk.

The

problem

with

the Appellant's

assertion is that there is, in the present case, no promisor.
promise was made.

No

Interrogatory number 5 and the jury's answer,

make it clear that no promise was made, and the lower court
further found that under the circumstances of this case, as it
was tried below, no promise could be made.

The Appellant seeks

to impose by law a promise in derrogation of the agreement of the
parties.
8

The Petition for Rehearing should be denied because the
jury found facts which disposed of the case in its entirety.

It

is inappropriate for the Court now to reverse the decision of the
lower court and the jury.

If the Appellant wanted the jury to

find something further, or to answer any further Interrogatories,
the time for the Appellant to have made such a request was at
trial.

The Appellant did not make such a request in the court

below, and should be estopped from reversing the jury after the
fact when the jury reached a decision that was intended to
dispose of the case.
III.
IN THE LOWER COURT BOTH PARTIES AND THE COURT TRIED THE
CASE ON AND "EXPRESS AGREEMENT" BASIS, AND TO PERMIT THE APPELLANT TO CHANGE ITS LEGAL THEORY TO AN "IMPLIED AGREEMENT" FOR THE
FIRST TIME AFTER TRIAL DENIES THE RESPONDENT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
The Respondent is entitled to receive notice of the
claims that are asserted against it. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that notice be given in a Plaintiff's
Complaint of the claim asserted.

The Appellant's Complaint as

well as the theory pursued at trial by the Appellant, focused
9

exclusively on the Appellant's assertion that an express agreement had been reached guarantying delivery of materials within a
specified time frame.

This theory was unproven by the Appellant.

This theory was disposed of by the jury in their reply to Interrogatory number 5.

Having failed to prove its case, the Appel-

lant now changes its theory for the first time after the trial
and urges that the decision of the jury should be overridden and
the Appellant should be given a windfall victory on a new legal
theory which respondent was not allowed to answer at Trial.
Fundamental fairness, due process of law, and notice
pleading require that that theory be plead before it be tried or
that it be tried before decided.

Appellant has neither plead nor

tried the theory it now wants decided.

If the Supreme Court is

persuaded that this legal theory has some potential validity, the
appropriate course is not to reverse the lower court but to
instead

require

a

presented to a jury.
not irrefutable.
the

law upon

retrial

with

the

new

legal

theory being

The legal theory of an implied promise is

An implied promise does not cfet imposed under

every

state of the

facts, notwithstanding

agreements, representations, or conduct of the parties.
possible to refute an implied promise.
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the

It is

Respondent should be

given the opportunity to show there was no such promise because
none could be made.
Significantly, the lower court did not limit Interrogatory number 5 to being either an "express" or "implied"
promise or guarantee.

The jury found that there was no promise

or guarantee given by the Respondent.

The only consistent way to

harmonize this decision with the failure of the Appellant to
assert in its pleadings an implied promise, is to decide that
there was no promise either express or implied given under the
state of the facts.

If the court decides, however, that an

implied promise theory is appropriate to be considered, the Court
on appeal is not the appropriate tribunal to consider what effect
that would have on the mind of the jury.

Instead a retrial

should be ordered and due process granted to the Respondent and
an opportunity to meet this new theory at trial afforded.

As

things now stand the Appellant is urging on the court a legal
theory that the Respondent has never had an opportunity to meet
or refute at trial.
The effect of the jury's answer to Interrogatory number
5 is that no promise or guarantee, express or implied, was given
to the Appellant by the Respondent.
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In light of the answer of

the jury to Interrogatory number 5, a finding that there was an
obligation express, implied, or otherwise, effectively substitutes the Supreme Court for the jury.

(See eg, First Security

Bank of Utah, Nat. A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl. Inc. 454 P.2d 886 (U.
1969))
The Jury was intended by the parties to be the finder
of fact.

The jury found that in fact there was no promise or

guarantee given.

Based upon this, the lower court entered an

appropriate judgment in favor of the Respondent.
appropriate

to

reverse

the

jury's decision

on

It is not
Interrogatory

number 5 and find that there is a promise or guarantee, when the
jury concluded that there was none.

(See Cottrell v. Grand Union

Tea Company. 299 P.2d 622, 626, (U. 1956.))
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Rehearing fails to comply with the
requirements of Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
There is nothing new presented in argument or in fact.

The

Appellant is simply reiterating what had previously been submitted, considered, and rejected by the lower court and the Utah
Supreme Court in prior decisions.
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The jury was asked to decide this case in its entirety.
The jury did so.

The jury's decision on Interrogatory number 5

negates any promise or guarantee, express or implied, and nothing
further should be added to or taken away from the jury's decision
in order to reach a contrary result*
If the Court were to find that there was an implied
promise, when that theory was never asserted to the jury in the
court below, the Respondent would be denied due process of law.
The only way to cure such a denial of due process would be to
order a retrial and to submit to the jury new Interrogatories
asking them to decide facts relevant to establishing or rebutting
an implied promise, such as remoteness of the location, the
familiarity of the parties with the remote location, and the
reasonableness of the implication sought.

Such findings cannot

be made without consideration of evidence, which was excluded
from Trial on Appellant's Motion, concerning shipping provisions.
Finally,

granting

this

Motion

would

complete

the

process of changing this from Trial by jury to Trial by ordeal.
Appellant has had a Trial, a rehearing, and an appeal.
contract being

litigated was specifically

formulated

The

so that

Triax paid all costs of performance directly to the employees or
13

vendors.

Triax's payments to Co-Ax were the profit on the work

performed by Co-Ax, made as the work was performed.

The present

lawsuit is merely Co-Ax's attempt to obtain profit payments on
work that they elected not to perform.
line 11 through p. 607, line 16)
justice
apple."

or

equity

(Trial Transcript p. 596,

It is difficult to see any

in giving Appellant

"another bite at the

Since Appellant has not even complied with the minimum

requirements

stated

in Rule 35 for considereition of such a

request, granting the request would be manifestly ^unjust.
DATED this

r~^ day qfJDec^mber^^S?

D^ffver C. Snu&fei
^MADDOX, NEI^SON & ^NUEFER
Attorneys tor Appellee

William ^Tixon

<s-~

TimwcnyWilTardson
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